In the thirty years since the appearance of Metaphors We Live By, cognitive linguistics has developed into a flourishing autonomous branch of inquiry. Interdisciplinary contacts, however, have largely been restricted to literary studies and the cognitive sciences and hardly extended towards the social sciences. This is the more surprising as, in 1970s anthropology, metaphor was seen as a key notion for the study of symbolism more generally. This contribution explores the cognitive linguistic view of social and cultural factors. Lakoff and Johnson appear ambivalent regarding the relation between culture and cognition; but they share the belief, elaborated in detail by Gibbs and Turner (2002), that cultural factors can be accounted for in terms of cognitive processes. This view runs into both methodological and philosophical difficulties. Methodologically, it assumes that cultural factors can be reduced to cognitive processes; philosophically, it boils down to a Cartesian emphasis on inner experience explaining outer phenomena. There are substantial anti-Cartesian strains both in contemporary philosophy and in a major current of EighteenthCentury philosophy. The latter, in particular, emphasized the importance of embodiment and metaphor in cognition. As an alternative, I will sketch a more consistently semiotic-and practice-oriented approach that proceeds from linguistic practices to cognitive processes rather than the other way around. It takes practices as irreducibly public and normative; on this approach, so-called linguistic ideologies (Silverstein 1979) play a constitutive role in both linguistic practice and language structure. This alternative builds on recent developments in linguistic anthropology and the work of Peirce and Bakhtin. It suggests a different look at the relation between cognition, language, and social practice from that suggested in cognitive linguistics.
INTRODUCTION
The 1980 appearance of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's Metaphors We Live By (henceforth MWLB) marks the beginnings of cognitive linguistics: a research paradigm that has seen tremendous growth over the past three decades. Characteristic of this paradigm is a fruitful interdisciplinary cooperation with -among others -departments of literature and cognitive science. Yet, there is a remarkable one-sidedness to this interdisciplinary blossoming: one sees little if any substantial exchange or collaboration between cognitive linguistics and the social sciences.
This lack of contact is all the more surprising as, in the late 1970s, metaphor appeared to become the master trope of symbolic and cognitive anthropology: thus, in 1974, James Fernandez argued that metaphor is the key figure -or master trope -of symbolic anthropology. However, by the early 1990s -in a volume significantly entitled Beyond Metaphor (Fernandez 1991) -he suggests that the study of his writings, Lakoff uncritically reproduces a romantic and ahistorical notion of culture as timeless and anonymous, involving shared norms and values. His 'culture' concept can be called communitarian, insofar as it presumes cultural communities as given. The question for social scientists to answer, however, is precisely how such communities are created, and how they either sustain themselves or are transformed? A related question is, who can legitimately claim to represent a culture or determine which conceptions and values are shared by -or even constitutive of -that community? In his discussions of conceptual and cultural relativism, Lakoff appears to presume the domains of language, thought, and culture as three distinct entities. The separation of these domains, however, requires a substantial process of purification that is relatively recent and by no means uncontested (Bauman & Briggs 2003: Ch. 8 ). The very conception of culture presumed by Lakoff and Johnson as self-evident or unproblematic is surprisingly recent: the term culture did not get its currently widespread meaning until around 1800.
Thus, the 'culture concept' assumed in cognitive linguistics appears to be thoroughly romantic and communitarian. However, perhaps one should not belabour the problems with and shortcomings in Lakoff and Johnson's views; but rather, more constructively, ask how cognitive-linguistic approaches could be extended or modified to accommodate a more sophisticated view of the complexities of human culture and society: more specifically, to accommodate the findings of social sciences. Gibbs (1999) offers a brief, programmatic attempt and Turner (2002) a more detailed argument in this direction. Let us consider both in turn.
Gibbs acknowledges that cognition arises from interaction between embodied mind and a cultural -not just physical -world. He argues that cognitive linguistics should be extended to accommodate these cultural aspects; but he stops short of drawing the more radical conclusion that cultural factors, interacting with embodied cognition, may be at least partly constitutive of the latter. Of course, such a view would lead to radical questioning of the idea of 'basic-level concepts' as not only a nonmetaphorical foundation for cognition, but directly meaningful and intrinsically intentional (cf. Lakoff 1987: 267) . This view runs afoul of the crucial -probably irreducible -cultural component in such allegedly basic-level concepts as CHAIR and MOTHER. Chairs are obviously cultural artefacts, and mothers are not simply biologically given, but -to an important extent -socially constituted.
Motherhood, like kinship relations more generally, involves a distinct social role and a distinct social status that may vary widely across cultures. Like all kinship relations, it is cultural as much as biological. The assumption that these biological dimensions are prior is both theory-driven and debateable, not self-evidently true.
Mark Turner (2002) attempts to present cognitive linguistics as a foundational auxiliary science for the social sciences, giving a cognitive twist to Clifford Geertz's interpretive approach to anthropology -which already heavily employs concepts and methods from literary theory and philosophy, in particular semiotics and hermeneutics. Echoing Max Weber, Geertz argues that human behaviour is a form of symbolic action; the anthropologist's or sociologist's task is to explicate the social meanings of the symbols involved. To mention one famous example, the Balinese cockfights explored by Geertz (1973) tell something deep about Balinese culture. The violent cockfight functions as a peaceful -indeed playful -enactment of rivalries or hostilities between kin groups and villages or even, on a broader stage, between the islands of Bali and Java.
Turner argues that these cultural meanings are generated by the basic cognitive operation of what he calls blending. Social science 'looks at meanings all the time, but not at the problem of meaning ' (2002: 10) : that is, it presumes the existence of meaning as an explanatory entity, rather than exploring how it comes about as a feature -or result -of people's biological, cultural, and social makeup. It is here that cognitive linguistics can help, he claims, as it sets out to account for meanings as the result of basic mental -hence, biologically endowed -operations. He identifies blending, rather than the earlier notions of conceptual metaphor and conceptual mapping, as the central and universal process generating the meanings involved in social action.
Much of Turner's book reads like a cognitivist gloss on Geertz's interpretive approach to social science. It attempts to account for the social-scientific preoccupation with questions of meaning and culture in terms of a cognitive-scientific preoccupation with mind and brain, and meaning in terms of conceptual metaphors, idealized cognitive models, mappings, and blendings. It explains cultural particularity and historical specificity in terms of a 'mental ability that is permanent, indispensable, and apparently universal to human beings ' (2002: 20) . In doing so, however, Turner risks wholly reducing social action to underlying biological and mental processes. As I will show, there are good philosophical as well as methodological reasons to resist this reduction. Apart from the question how much these allegedly universal operations and basic-level concepts are, in part, culturally shaped or constituted, this reduction leaves unanswered the question whether and how cultural practicesinherently public and normative -can be explained by, and reduced to, mental processes that are purely causal and private. The problems with reducing public to private and normative to causal are of both a philosophical and logical nature.
One can take such a practice-theoretical perspective as no more than a methodological choice that may, or may not, lead to new insights. It need not be read as making any substantive claim about human cognition. So the question is whether this perspective leads merely to new insights, or to empirically more plausible incorporation of cultural factors into a cognitive account. As I noted above, authors within a cognitive paradigm start with the 'inner', from which they try to extend or extrapolate to the outer, cultural world (see e.g. Gibbs 1999) . One might just as well proceed in the opposite direction, taking linguistic and other public practices as constitutive of mental structures, not the other way around. In taking such a 'practice turn' concerning language use, one need not commit oneself to any substantial philosophical or psychological claims about the character of human thought. Viewing the line of inquiry as no more than a methodological choice, one may explore the questions and insights it leads to. The idea that linguistic practices may be constitutive of cognitive processes should be distinguished, of course, from the 'objectivist' view that metaphor is a purely linguistic phenomenon with no cognitive import -even though the latter claim, like the former, seems to elevate the level of linguistic expression above that of cognitive processes. A practice-theoretical approach can well accommodate the idea that social practices -and, hence, cognitive processes -are embodied. 
LAKOFF AND JOHNSON'S CARTESIAN FOUNDATIONALISM
I propose having a closer look at some of the systematic philosophical considerations concerning a cognitive account of metaphor. Previous authors have objected to the way Lakoff repeatedly resorts to straw-man arguments in discussing earlier philosophical theories of metaphor; but that is not my main concern. Neither am I concerned with the overly sweeping opposition that Lakoff and Johnson create between an 'objectivism' that allegedly believes in an objective reality and objectively given meanings -meanings that can be characterized without appeal to embodied human cognition or conceptual metaphor -and a romantic 'subjectivism' that allegedly treats inner embodied experience as purely individual, subjective, and unconstrained (MWLB chapters 25-28). My focus will rather be on the relationship between Lakoff and Johnson's approach and some of the most forceful anti-Cartesian arguments in Twentieth-Century philosophy.
Despite the so-called 'linguistic turn' in Twentieth-Century analytic -and, in a rather different way, Continental -philosophy, for a long time Anglo-Saxon philosophers had little to say about metaphor. It was not until the 1960s that analytically trained philosophers like Max Black, Monroe Beardsley, and H.P. Grice started taking metaphor seriously. Analytic or 'objectivist' philosophy tended to reject metaphor as mere stylistic embellishment with no cognitive import. At least as problematic is the analytic tendency to relegate metaphor to the domain of language use rather than linguistic meaning -as was done by Searle, Grice, and Davidson in particular.
2 In MWLB and later works, Lakoff and Johnson focus on the formalist strain in analytic philosophy and its offshoots in formal semantics, as represented by e.g. Quine, David Lewis, Saul Kripke, and Richard Montague.
Despite their often one-sided and exaggerated depictions -on occasion, downright caricatures -of these authors, Lakoff and Johnson's criticism of what they call 'objectivist' semantics -in particular, the tacit assumption among many analytical philosophers that literal meaning is unproblematically given -is largely justified.
However, another strain in analytic philosophy is both more relevant and more threatening to the entire cognitive-linguistic undertaking. This is the more informal, anti-Cartesian current that explains language and knowledge in terms of public or social practices, represented by e.g. the later
Wittgenstein and by 'ordinary language' philosophy. It rejects the classical empiricist claim that abstract conceptual knowledge rests on -and can be reduced to -purely non-conceptual, direct causal interaction with the world through the organs of perception, but also attacks the rationalist, Cartesian form of 'foundationalism'. Consideration of Lakoff and Johnson's arguments suggests that their cognitive paradigm remains bound to the main tenets of -and so runs into the same problems asCartesian foundationalist epistemology.
The question is less whether cognitive linguistics is more Cartesian rationalist or Locke-style empiricist in character and more how far Lakoff and Johnson reproduce the foundationalist assumptions inherent in both approaches: foundationalism in both its rationalist and empiricist guise has come under increasing attack in Twentieth-Century philosophy. Of course, the most famous attack on any Cartesian reduction of public language use to private mental states is Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of mental states as explanations for linguistic meanings: in particular, the private-language argument in Philosophical Investigations (1953: §139-202) . Meanwhile, the empiricist assumption that conceptualized knowledge states -inherently normative, because they involve correct or incorrect beliefs, propositions, and states -can be reduced to purely causal interaction with the world finds forceful criticism in (Sellars 1956 Equally surprising is Lakoff's one-sided reading of (Putnam 1981 Criticism of this Cartesian 'objectivism' -if that is the right term -is not new. Indeed, the general thrust of recent analytical philosophy has been to treat language use as holistic, public, and irreducibly normative practice: that is where things stood by the late 1970s, and where they still stand today. Of course, Cartesian rationalism has also been criticized by the phenomenological tradition. In MWLB
and again in PIF, Lakoff and Johnson acknowledge Merleau-Ponty and -to a lesser extent -John
Dewey as precursors to their own embodied realism; but they do not explicate this ancestry in any detail. Meanwhile, the subsequent practical turn goes beyond the phenomenological project, which -at least in Merleau-Ponty's formulation -remains within broadly Cartesian confines.
In short, Lakoff and Johnson's ultimately Cartesian approach to metaphor and embodied cognition places them much more in an outdated European philosophical tradition than they realize.
Despite their wholesale rejection of the 'Western philosophical tradition' for being objectivist, they take insufficient distance from it: their position and its subsequent elaborations are recognizably 
METAPHOR IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY: EMBODIMENT IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT
Lakoff and Johnson's line of argument is very much shaped by romantic oppositions such as those between reasoned and felt, subjective and objective, inner and outer. In MWLB chapters 25-29, they claim to transcend the distinction between an objectivism informed by Enlightenment rationalism, scientificity, and objective validity on the one hand and an unconstrained Romantic subjectivism that rejects objective science in favour of purely individual, subjective, irrational experience on the other. The arguments pursued by Condillac, Vico, and others make it possible to see cognition as mediated -if not constituted -by the use of symbols; metaphor plays a crucial role in this process of linguistically mediated and practically constituted cognition. They represent a historically significant philosophical tradition suggesting that public use of language is constitutive of inner mental thought rather than vice versa. there is an important analytical difference: linguistic ideologies are public rather than private representations; they are primarily linguistic rather than cognitive entities; they are not only culturally specific but generally indicative of class, status, and power. They have also an important -if not irreducible -indexical dimension.
COGNITIVE MODELS AND LINGUISTIC IDEOLOGIES

5
The crucial insight is that metaphor does not generally involve decontextualized conceptual mapping but is context dependent. In recent years, more attention has come to be devoted to metaphor as a discourse phenomenon -argued for, along rather different lines, in both philosophy (Leezenberg 2001: 217-239) and applied linguistics (Cameron & Deigman 2006 cognitive approach -which, at the very least, appears to presume aspects of the conduit metaphorrests on a potentially misleading framing of language as merely derivative of thought.
One final question to raise is why the study of metaphor -and, perhaps, tropes more generallydisappeared so suddenly from anthropology. I have no good answer; but this disappearance seems to have happened in conjunction with the gradual eclipse of cognitive and symbolic approaches. Like symbolic anthropology, the cognitive linguistic paradigm takes cultures as systems of knowledge or as scripts or texts to be executed or implemented. In recent years, cognitive and symbolic approaches in anthropology have largely been sidelined by what one might call a 'practical turn'. Nowadays, anthropologists study embodied public practices rather than embodied private mental processes.
The key development may have been the gradual emergence of linguistic anthropology during the 1980s and '90s. This sub-discipline, distinguishing itself both from social and cultural anthropology and from linguistics, is of a semiotic rather than cognitive orientation, inspired less by Weber's interpretive social science, which crucially informed Geertz's approach to anthropology, than by early, non-structuralist authors like C.S. Peirce and Mikhail Bakhtin writing on signs and linguistic practice.
Within this framework, more attention tends to be given to societal questions of language use, power relations, and public ideologies rather than linguistic structure, conceptual relations, and mental models. Questions of linguistic and conceptual structure fade into the background in favour of questions of what language users do -and believe -in qualifying linguistic items or speech genres as e.g. poetical or metaphorical. These questions point to the considerable -historically and culturally variable -amount of work that must be done to construe, or purify, such apparently self-evident domains and categories as those of language, culture, 'the literal', 'the poetical', etc.
Despite cognitive linguistics' unmistakeable successes, its cognitive conception of culture remains unsatisfactory, resting on implicit, outdated Romantic assumptions rather than any empirically informed, theoretically sophisticated account of how culture is produced, sustained, and contested.
One way to begin to remedy this might be to extend cognitive linguistic conceptions to the sphere of cultural practices, as Gibbs and Turner have attempted; but this does not resolve the underlying conceptual problems. It also rests on a kind of anthropology that is largely outdated. In many respects,
Lakoff and Johnson have a thoroughly Romantic conception of metaphor. In other respects, however, their account of cognition as embodied and experiential rests on an assumed Cartesian picture, which still takes cognitive processes to be explainable in terms of individual -ultimately private -bodily experience, rather than public -and possibly embodied -practice.
Another solution is to explore the relation between cognition and culture the other way around:
i.e., to explore questions of cognitive processes and conceptual mappings via a more properly semiotic approach that takes human cognition as mediated -if not partly constituted -by use of symbols. Such an approach that focuses on linguistic practices understood as inherently public, normative, and power-saturated, can be taken either as a substantial philosophical claim or as no more than a methodological choice. Its claim that public language use is constitutive of private mental states rather than the other way around should not be mistaken for the 'objectivist' view that metaphor is merely a linguistic device without cognitive import. It has a venerable philosophical pedigree, traceable not only to Twentieth-Century philosophers like Wittgenstein and social theorists like Bourdieu and Foucault, but also to earlier thinkers like Vico, Condillac, and Herder.
Of course, the big open question is whether -and, if so, to what extent -metaphor remains relevant for linguistic anthropology and other social sciences; and, conversely, whether the social sciences after the practical turn still have anything interesting to say about metaphor or conceptual organization in general. One would hope for an answer in the affirmative; but, if so, at this stage it would express a wish rather than a conviction.
